In Parveen v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932 (25 April 2018) the Court of Appeal considered §276ADE(1)(vi) and the question of 'very significant obstacles' to integration. The test set out in the Immigration Rules was previously considered by a Presidential panel of the UT in Treebhawon v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKUT 13 (IAC) who put a gloss on the test making it more difficult for applicants to satisfy. In Parveen the Court of Appeal adopted a simpler construction focussing on the plain meaning of the words:
9.That passage focuses more on the concept of integration than on what is meant by "very significant obstacles". The latter point was recently addressed by the Upper Tribunal (McCloskey J and UTJ Francis) in Treebhawon v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKUT 13 (IAC). At para. 37 of its judgment the UT said:
"The other limb of the test, 'very significant obstacles', erects a self-evidently elevated threshold, such that mere hardship, mere difficulty, mere hurdles and mere upheaval or inconvenience, even where multiplied, will generally be insufficient in this context."
I have to say that I do not find that a very useful gloss on the words of the rule. It is fair enough to observe that the words "very significant" connote an "elevated" threshold, and I have no difficulty with the observation that the test will not be met by "mere inconvenience or upheaval". But I am not sure that saying that "mere" hardship or difficulty or hurdles, even if multiplied, will not "generally" suffice adds anything of substance. The task of the Secretary of State, or the Tribunal, in any given case is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as "very significant".
The above extract is worth citing when making applications and appeals under §276ADE(1)(vi) along with the SSHD's policy which I have referred to in a previous post.